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APPELLANTS BRIEF ON APPEAL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This suit was filed by the Plaintiffs, beneficiaries under a certain Marie 
Dorothy Wattis Trust instrument, against three (3) Defendants who were alleged 
to be Trustees of such trust and had, by mismanagement and other acts , caused 
losses to the Plaintiffs. '.,T'* * ! y"f 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Trial on the issues involving all parties was held in December of 1973 
resulting in a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendants John 
and Dorothy Dussault for an amount in excess of One Hundred Forty Thousand 
Dollars ($140,000.00) and a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant/ 
Appellant Donald Bowman in the sum of Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Eighteen 
and .91/1.00 Dollars ($11,318.91) . Such judgment was entered by the Court on 
March 5, 1974. 
Subsequently, Defendants Dussault filed an appeal from this judgment, which 
appeal was docketed in this Court as Case No. 13657. After briefing and argument, 
a decision was rendered by this Court on May 20, 1975 reversing the Trial Court fs 
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants John and Dorothy Dussault. 
No appeal from the judgment was ever filed by Defendant Donald Bowman within 
time provided by law or at all . 
On or about May 22, 1975 Defendant Donald Bowman filed a motion to set 
aside the judgment against him, which motion was granted by the order of the 
Honorable John F . Wahlquist on January 6, 1976, setting aside the earlier judgment 
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against Donald Bowman and granting a new trial in the matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs and Appellants seek reversal of the January 6, 1976 order of 
the Honorable John F . Wahlquist and reinstatement of the judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against Defendant/Respondent Donald W. Bowman of March 5, 1974. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS , ^ t 
The Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust is an instrument drawn years ago and 
which governs the operations of the trust as conducted by the three (3) Trustees , 
John Dussault, Dorothy Dussault and Donald Bowman. Each of these Trustees 
was a successor Trustee to the original Trustees who were appointed in 1938. 
The trust sustained huge losses during a period of time these Trustees 
were conducting the operations, such losses mainly having to do with purchases 
and sales of securities on margin and lack of diversification on the investments. 
After two (2) p re - t r i a l s , extensive discovery and a four-day t r ia l , the Trial Court 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law , together with a judgment based 
upon those Findings and Conclusions. The judgment found Plaintiffs were entitled 
to damages against the Defendants Dussault in the sum of One Hundred Forty-Three 
Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-Six and .03/1.00 Dollars ($143,526.03). Such 
judgment (R-10) also granted judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant 
Donald Bowman in the sum of Eleven Thousand Three Hundred Eighteen and .91/1.00 
Dollars ($11,318.91) . It further granted Defendant Bowman a right of contribution 
or indemnification against Defendants Dussault for the amount of the judgment 
against Bowman. 
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At trial of the case, the Defendants Dussault were represented by counsel, 
and the Defendant Donald Bowman was represented by separate counsel. Sub-
sequent to the entry of judgment, the Defendants Dussault duly filed and docketed 
and prosecuted a notice of appeal from the judgment. This was Case No. 13657 
in this Court and after briefing and argument, by decision filed May 20, 1975, this 
Court found that under the terms of the trust instrument, the Defendants Dussault 
had the power to do what they did and therefore were not liable. 
The Defendant Bowman, however, did not file any notice of appeal and did 
not participate in the prosecution of the appeal from the District Court to the Supreme 
Court. The first activity of any type noted on behalf of the Defendant Donald Bowman 
was the motion to set aside judgment (R-12) filed on June 2 but served earlier than 
that, sometime shortly after the decision of this Court relieving the Dussaults 
from liability. 
The motion to set aside judgment was not supported by any affidavits and 
no testimony was taken. However, both Defendant Donald Bowman and Plaintiffs 
submitted memorandums of authority to the Trial Court (R-14, R-17) indicating 
their positions in the matter. Both Respondent Bowman's motion and the memoran-
dum in support thereof were based upon the provisions of Rule 60 (b) U.R.C .P. 
and particularly subsections 5, 6 and 7 thereof (R-12, R-14) . Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants herein opposed this position upon the basis that the motion was not timely 
filed and upon the basis that the Court had no jurisdiction as the time for appeal 
had elapsed and the judgment had become final (R-17) . 
;
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On November 28, 1975 Judge Wahlquist entered a memorandum decision 
providing as follows: 
The Court hereby grants Donald W. Bowman a new trial on 
the basis that the earlier judgment rendered was based on 
the Court finding that Dussault had improperly caused losses. 
The case was tried on that basis and the Supreme Court has 
now ruled that Dussault 's conduct does not make the Trustee 
liable. (R-19) 
This memorandum decision was followed by an order entered by Judge 
Wahlquist on January 6, 1976 vacating the judgment against Donald Bowman and 
granting a new trial in the action between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Donald 
Bowman (R-20) . 
From the judgment entered, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal (R-21) 
and have asked this Court to review the entry of that order and to restore the 
judgment of Plaintiffs against the Defendant Donald Bowman. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO MAKE AND ENTER THE 
ORDER OF JANUARY 6, 1976. 
In the trial of this case during four (4) days in December of 1973, Donald 
Bowman was present , represented by his own counsel, and testified and produced 
evidence in his behalf. He fully participated in the t r ia l , having his day in Court. 
Judgment was entered by the Court against him March 5, 1974, and no appeal 
was taken from that judgment. No question has been raised as to the validity 
of that judgment; i . e . , the Court had jurisdiction and after trial rendered a valid 
judgment against him. Absent appeal, the judgment became final in April of 1974 
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and the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to thereafter vacate i t . 
Particularly, the Trial Court had no power to order a new trial as it did. 
No motion for new trial was made, and such a motion would not have been timely 
if filed, Rule 59 (b) U.R .C .P. The power of the Court to grant a new trial on its 
own initiative is limited to ff. . . not later than ten (10) days after entry of judg-
ment. . . " , Rule 59 (d) U .R .C .P . 
Absent qualifying for equitable relief under 60 (b) U.R.C . P . , (to be dis-
cussed in Point Two), the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to do what it did. The 
overriding principle of the rules respecting new t r ia ls , 60 (b) relief, and appeal 
times is to assure the finality of judgments, Kolbrook v Hodson, 24 U. 2d 120, 
466 P . 2d 843, Anderson v Anderson, 3 U. 2d 277, 282 P . 2d 845. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VACATING THE BOWMAN JUDGMENT. 
Granting of relief under 60 (b) U .R.C.P . is equitable, and generally will 
not be interfered with on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion 
by the Trial Court. Board of Education v Cox, 14 U. 2d 385, 384 P . 2d 806. 
The Trial Court may not, however, act arbitrarily in that regard , Mayhew v 
Gilsonite, 14 U. 2d 52, 376 P . 2d 951; its power is not without limitation and cannot 
be exercised capriciously or arbi t rar i ly , Kettner v Snow, 13 U. 2d 382, 375 
P . 2d 28. Relief may be granted only where it is made to appear that for one 
or more of the reasons specified in Rule 60 (b) justice has been so thwarted that 
equity and good conscience demand that this extraordinary relief be granted. 
And the burden of showing facts to justify doing so is upon him who seeks such 
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relief. Kettner v Snow, supra . 
Rule 60 (b) , U .R .C .P . insofar as here applicable, is as follows: 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertance; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered 
Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just , 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order , or proceeding for the 
following reasons . . . (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which 
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1) , 
(2) , (3) , or (4) , not more than 3 months after the judgment, order , 
or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining 
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Federal Rule 60 (b) is in substance the same, except the period for filing 
under 1 , 2 , 3 and 4 (not here applicable) is 1 year rather than 3 months as in 
Utah. 
The Motion to Set Aside (R-12) was based on 60 (b) 5 and 7. The 
memorandum of authority filed by Bowman in support of the motion argued the 
applicability of 60 (b) 6 and 7 (R-14) . The Memorandum Decision of the Trial 
Court (R-19) and the order vacating the judgment (R-20) do not specify which 
rule was used as the basis for the decision, but merely state the earlier judgment 
was based on a finding as to Dussault, which finding was later reversed . 
1. 60 (b) (5) U .R .C .P . does not apply in this case. Clearly, the Trial Court 
had jurisdiction to render the March 5, 1974 judgment against Bowman. Its j u r i s -
diction over the subject matter, the parties and the issues is not now and never has 
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been challenged. In discussing "void judgment" under 60 (b) of the Federal 
Rules, the case of Lubben v Selective Service, 1st C C A . 1972, 453 F . 2d 
645 stated: 
A void judgment is to be distinguished from an erroneous one, in that 
the latter is subject only to direct attack. A void judgment is one 
which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal 
effect. In the interest of finality, the concept of void judgments is 
narrowly construed. While absence of subject matter jurisdiction 
may make a judgment void, such total want of jurisdiction must be 
distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. A court 
has the power to determine its own jurisdiction, and an error in that 
determination will not render the judgment void. Only in the ra re 
instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered 
void. 
The Bowman judgment can in no manner be classified a fvoid judgment 
under 60 (b) (5) , U .R .C .P . 
II. 60 (b) (6) U .R .C .P . does not justify vacation of the Bowman judgment. 
The only segment of 60 (b) (6) that could appear to have application here 
is if a . . . "prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated," . . . (emphasis added) . BowmanTs argument to the Trial Court (R-15) 
was that the Dussault judgment (of the same date) was a prior judgment, and since 
it was subsequently reversed, Bowman qualified for relief under 60 (b) (6) . 
Initially, we note that if Bowman is entitled to relief under this section, 
the motion was timely filed. Since such a motion cannot be filed until reversal of 
the prior judgment, the reasonable time required by the rule must run not from the 
original judgment of March 5, 1974, but from the reversal of May 20, 1975. See 
Jackson v Jackson, Court of Appeals D . C , 1960, 276 F . 2d 501. 
The problem with the Bowman argument is that the judgment under attack 
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was not based upon a prior judgment of any nature . The findings against Bowman 
made by the Trial Court (R-2,7) were completely separate from, and based upon 
different acts than those found against Dussault. The acts of Bowman consisted 
of inattention and omission, while the acts of Dussault were active and pr imary. 
Nevertheless, they were separate and distinct, and resulted in a judgment against 
Bowman based upon his acts or omissions, and damage resul t ing. 
We concede that if the decision of May 20, 1975 had been before the Trial 
Court before March 5, 1974, no judgment would have been entered against either 
Dussault or Bowman. However, it was not the law of Utah before May 20, 1975, 
and the Bowman judgment was not based upon any prior judgment, Dussault 's 
or otherwise. A change in judicial view of the applicable law after a final judg-
ment is not a basis for vacating the judgment, Berryhill v United States, 6th 
C .C .A. , 1952, 199 F . 2d 217: 
The motion to vacate the judgment states no reason for not taking an 
appeal. It appears to be the settled rule that a change in the judicial 
view of the applicable law, after a final judgment, is not a basis for 
vacating a judgment entered before announcement of the change. 
Sunal v La rge , , 332 U .S . 174, 67S .Ct . 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982; 
Scotten v Littlefield, 235 U.S . 407, 35 S.Ct. 125, 59 L.Ed,, 289; 
United States v Kunz, 2 C i r . , 163 F . 2d 344; Lehman Co. v Appleton 
Toy & Furniture Co . , 7 C i r . , 148 F . 2d 988. 
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol 7, 60.26 (3) in discussing this question 
refers to a 'first' and 'second' judgment. To be prior clearly indicates the judg-
ment under attack is one that is based on another, separate, and preceding judg-
ment. Such was not the case he re , and the Trial Court 's Memorandum Decision 
(R-19) and Order (R-20) both indicate the basis for it is the change in the law 
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resulting* from the May 20, 1975 opinion of this Court. Under Berry hil l , this is 
not sufficient. 
III. 60 (b) (7) is not applicable to these circumstances. Two separate 
arguments militate against application of 60 (b) (7) - the time of filing the motion, 
and the substance of the motion itself. The motion, to be eligible for relief, must 
be filed within a freasonable' time. Here we have over 14 months elapsing from entry 
of judgment to filing of the motion. Jur in v Wiltshire Parkway, D .C . Court of 
Appeals, 1956, 238 F . 2d 263, found 16 months after judgment not reasonable. 
U .S . v 140.80 Acres of Land, D.C. Louisiana, 1963, 32 F .R .D. 11, found 14 
months not reasonable. We do not think there can be any inflexible standard applied 
as to what is reasonable, but clearly over 14 months would not seem to qualify. 
As to the substance of the motion, is the reversal of the Dussault judgment 
valid as Tany other reason justifying rel ief? The question really becomes, can 
60 (b) be used to replace the appeal provisions of Rules 72 and 73, U .R .C .P . 
In other words , does Bowman get 2 bites at the proverbial apple? 
Two cases that are similar would indicate no. Annat v Beard, 5th C .C .A. 
1960, 277 F . 2d 554 was a condemnation action in which some parties to the suit 
appealed from a final judgment based on a Trial Court ruling adversely affecting 
all defendants with reference to description of properties taken. Annat did not so 
appeal, and after reversal of the other judgments filed a 60 (b) motion seeking 
relief. In denying relief the Circuit held: 
Relief under Rule 60 (b) was properly denied. The judgment, in so far 
as it affected Mrs. Annat's r igh ts , was not a void judgment, nor is there 
any other valid reason justifying relief upon the judgment. Mrs. Annat's 
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counsel, as we have already observed, were fully cognizant of the 
legal question involved in the adoption by the court of Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1. The ruling of the court in adopting that map as fixing 
locations, boundaries and areas become the law of the case and, 
since Mrs. Annat did not appeal, it remained the law of the case 
so far as she is concerned, even though as was determined in the 
Paradise Prairie Land Co. case, the judgment was erroneous. 
However, it is not void and not subject to being vacated under 
Rule 60 (b) (4) . The fact that the judgment was erroneous does 
not constitute "any other reason justifying relief." The remedy 
was by appeal. 
Ackermann v United States, 340 U . S . 193, 71S .Ct . 209, 956 Ed. 207 dealt with 
a failure to appeal from a denaturalization proceeding. The judgment cancelling 
the certificate of naturalization was entered December 7, 1943, the 60 (b) motion 
was filed March 25, 1948, citing under the "any other reason" provision of 60 (b) 
the following: He and one Keilbar had been tr ied on the same issues in a consoli-
dated case, with the same judgment; he had not appealed; Keilbar had appealed 
and his judgment was later reversed by the Court of Appeals, The Supreme Court 
held 60 (b) did not justify relief, stating: 
His choice was a r i sk , but calculated and deliberate and such as follows 
a free choice. Petitioner cannot be relieved of such a choice because 
hindsight seems to indicate to him that his decision not to appeal was 
probably wrong, considering the outcome of the Keilbar Case. There 
must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate 
choices are not to be relieved from. 
CONCLUSION 
It is indeed easy to sympathize with Bowman, who now finds himself worse 
off than his co-defendant Dussault. Nevertheless, Appellants had a final judg-
ment , and the question to be decided is whether Bowman is now legally entitled 
to relief. We do submit, that the facts in this case do not justify the Trial Court's 
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actions of vacating the Bowman judgment and granting a new trial, 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellants 
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